Abstract: Is nonverbal communication capable of affecting economic outcomes? We study the effect of anticipated approval and disapproval, expressed through emoticons, on generosity and show that it discourages selfish behavior. In our experiment subjects play a one-shot dictator game at the end of which the recipient can respond to the allocation by drawing an emoticon and sending it back to the dictator. While the observed effect of nonverbal communication is somewhat weaker than the anticipation of a verbal response, our results provide evidence that people are willing to trade-off pecuniary gains to avoid disapproval or seek approval of their peers and that the sheer anticipation of receiving a response, even nonverbal, is sufficient to change their behavior.
Introduction
Is nonverbal communication capable of affecting economic outcomes? Anecdotal evidence suggests it might be, as power companies in the US have incorporated nonverbal feedback into approaches to reduce household power consumption and conserve energy. 1 In the UK, regional councils implemented speed signs displaying a smiling face when people are driving at or below the speed limit and a frowning face if they are speeding. The signs were able to decrease the number of drivers exceeding the speed limit by 53% (Sadler, 2009 ). Yet little is known about the mechanisms through which nonverbal communication influences decisions as in everyday life it is often combined with verbal expressions of, say, encouragement or expectations. In this paper we focus on one such mechanism and ask whether nonverbal cues are sufficient means of expressing approval and disapproval and whether this effect is anticipatory and deters selfish behavior.
The use of wordless signals and cues such as facial expression, body posture, or eye contact play a prominent role in communication. Burgoon et al. (1996) estimate that almost twothirds of the meaning of a social encounter is derived from nonverbal cues. The introduction of internet and mobile devices has resulted in new ways of how individuals and businesses communicate, with the face-to-face communication or phone calls being replaced by emails, texts, and messages via social networks. An important factor lacking from messages transcribed into text and transferred online is the non-verbal component; without being able to see the facial expression it can often be hard to convey the meaning and the tone. As a result the recipient of such messages might perceive them in ways the sender did not intend.
This deficiency led to an introduction of emoticons (or emoji), which are pictorial representations of human emotions, in online communication. 2 Their use is common in social network sites, such as Facebook, where people often post information in expectation of obtaining an approval ('like') from their peers. It is 'smiley' and 'frowning' face emoticons that US power companies use to nudge people to conserve energy and UK regional councils to slow down speeding drivers, through creating anticipatory approval and disapproval effects.
1 Opower produces energy consumption reports that are sent out to each household. The report contains feedback on the general energy consumption and includes a section where the consumption is rated using emoticons. This scheme has been successful in increasing energy efficiency as households reduce their energy consumption in anticipation of the nonverbal feedback on their energy reports (Stern, 2013) . 2 Their increased use culminated in 2014 when the word of the year, for the first time, was not actually a word but an emoticon; specifically the red love heart emoji featured in the Apple keyboard (The Washington Post, 2014) .
To the best of our knowledge, there are no economic studies exploring the impact of nonverbal cues, despite their prominence in communication. The vast majority of existing studies on the effects of communication on economic decisions deal with either free-form or stylized messages (see Crawford, 1998 for a survey). This research shows that messages are, for example, capable of increasing cooperation (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) , coordination (e.g. Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007) , enforcing social norms and preventing opportunistic behavior through informal non-monetary sanctions (e.g., Masclet et al., 2003; Rege and Telle, 2004) . Ellingsen and Johanesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) 
Experimental design and procedures
The experimental design consists of three conditions implemented in an across-subject design. The Baseline condition is a standard dictator game in which the randomly assigned dictator, (player A in the instructions) is endowed with $10 and the recipient (player B) with $0. The dictator can send any whole dollar amount between $1 and $10 to the randomly paired recipient or do nothing and keep both endowments unchanged. The recipient has no decision to make, thus the final allocation is entirely decided by the dictator.
The Emoticon condition is the same as Baseline except for an added stage at the end of the dictator game, where the recipient is given the opportunity to respond to the dictator's decision. After the decision is revealed to the recipient, the recipient can draw an emoticon and send it to the dictator. All stages are announced before the game begins, thus the dictator knows that the recipient can respond to her decision prior to deciding on an amount to be sent to the recipient. The recipient is free to draw any emoticon, however the subjects are warned in the instructions that foul and/or threatening emoticons are prohibited. The emoticon drawing form for this stage includes an empty circle into which the recipient can draw an emoticon.
The Message condition is the same as Baseline except for an added stage at the end of the dictator game, where the recipient is given the opportunity to respond to the dictator's decision using a freeform written message. This is a replication of Ellingsen and Johanesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) The experiment was conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Canterbury, with 188 undergraduate students serving as subjects. The participants were selected randomly from the database using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . An experimental session lasted 25 minutes on average, including the initial instruction period and the private payment of subjects. The subjects earned an average of 10 New Zealand Dollars (NZD) including a NZD 5 show up fee. 4 All sessions were run under a single-blind protocol, in which there was full anonymity between subjects, however the experimenter could track subjects' decisions and identities. Table 1 summarizes subject behavior and Figure 1 shows the distribution of amounts sent by dictators in our three conditions. The statistical tests are presented in Table 2 . Emoticons were drawn by all but one of the recipients in the Emoticon condition. These emoticons portrayed an array of different emotions, ranging from frowning and crying faces to smiling and winking faces (see the appendix). The amounts sent in Emoticon are weakly significantly higher than in Baseline (p=0.093), supporting Hypothesis 1 that anticipated nonverbal communication is capable of deterring selfish behavior. However, we do not find any effect of non-verbal communication on the frequency of sending a positive amount (p=0.147) or the proportion of equal splits (p=0.379). The effect on the proportion of splits that give the recipient at least 40% of the pie is marginally statistically insignificant (p=0.104). 4 At the time of the experiment the minimum wage in New Zealand was $14.25/hour. 5 We categorized emoticons as positive, neutral, or negative expressions. The average amount sent by dictators who received a positive emoticon in return was $4.67, neutral $2.63, and negative $0.20. The differences between amounts given for each emotional category were all statistically significant: positive vs. negative p=0.0002, positive vs. neutral p=0.0004 and negative vs. neutral p=0.0122.
Results

Figure 1. The distribution of amount sent by dictators
We find the effect of anticipated verbal communication on preventing selfish behavior to be stronger than the effect of non-verbal communication. We replicate the main results by Ellingsen and Johanesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) and find the amounts sent in Message to be significantly higher than in Baseline (p=0.006), supporting Hypothesis 2 that ex post messages result in a 'sharp tongue' avoidance effect. This is also true conditional on sending a positive amount (p=0.010) as well as for the equal splits (0.011) and splits that give the recipient at least 40% of the pie. We do not find any effect on the frequency of sending a positive amount (p=0.147).
While verbal communication increases the average amounts sent by more than non-verbal communication, this difference is marginally statistically insignificant for all data (p=0.109), providing some support for Hypothesis 3 that the anticipatory effects of verbal and nonverbal communication do not differ. There is no difference in the frequency of sending a positive amount (p=1.000) or splits that give the recipient at least 40% of the pie (p=0.793).
However, we observe weakly significantly more equal splits in Message than in Emoticon (0.077) and also a statistically significant difference in amounts sent conditional on the amount being positive (p=0.031). 
Discussion
Nonverbal cues are powerful tools in communication. Facial expression, body language, and gestures help convey the meaning of verbal messages and underline their tone. As such, they can have a nontrivial impact on economic decisions of agents and outcomes of interactions;
however the channels through which they operate are not fully understood. In the current paper we isolate the anticipatory effect of emotion expression through the use of emoticons and show that even on its own it is capable of discouraging selfish behavior. While the observed effect is somewhat weaker than the anticipation of a verbal response, our experiment provides evidence that people are willing to trade-off pecuniary gains to avoid disapproval or gain approval of their peers and that the sheer anticipation of receiving a response, even nonverbal, is sufficient to change their behavior.
While our results shed light on the design on mechanisms that curb opportunistic behavior, our experiment focuses only on a particular type of nonverbal communication and one channel through which it operates. Moreover, as a first step, we study the impact of nonverbal communication in isolation. To better understand its potential, the follow up research needs to explore other types of nonverbal cues and their interaction with verbal messages. 
Appendix 1. Baseline Instructions Instructions
Thank you for coming. Each of you will receive a $5 show-up fee, to be paid in cash at the end of the session. You will now have a chance to earn additional money. Earnings are confidential: only you and the experimenter will know the amount of money you make.
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. If you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
Roles and Pairing:
Every participant has been assigned randomly to a role; the role you have been assigned is written in the topright corner of this sheet. You have been randomly and anonymously paired with someone in this room. You will not know your partner's identity, nor will he/she know yours. Furthermore, these identities will not be revealed after the session is completed.
The Decision:
The decision concerns two people, Person A and Person B. Person A's task is to divide $10 between themselves and their matched Person B. Total earnings for each person at the end of the experiment depends on the decision made by Person A. This decision is made only once.
The Experiment: Stage 1: Person A chooses the division
Person A will be given a Decision Form; he/she will indicate the dividing option he/she wishes to choose by circling it on the decision form. After this choice is made the experimenter will collect all of the Decision Forms.
Stage 2: Person B receives Person A's decision
Person A's decision will be revealed to his/her randomly matched Person B. Person B's will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her earnings from the decision.
Stage 3: Person A's are paid
Person A's will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her earnings from the decision.
Once you have been paid you are free to leave, we ask that you do not wait around outside the lab. Thank you for participating. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to answer your question privately.
Appendix 2. Emoticon Instructions Instructions
Roles and Pairing:
The Decision:
The decision concerns two people, Person A and Person B. Person A's task is to divide $10 between themselves and their matched Person B. Once the decision is made by Person A their randomly matched Person B will then have the opportunity to respond to this decision by drawing an emoticon (emotional-icon) to send back to Person A. Please note: written messages and foul and/or threatening emoticons are not allowed. Total earnings for each person at the end of the experiment depends on the decision made by Person A. This decision is made only once.
The Experiment: Stage 1: Person A chooses the division
Stage 2: Person B receives Person A's decision
Person A's decision will be revealed to his/her randomly matched Person B, he/she will then have the opportunity to respond by drawing and sending an emoticon (emotional-icon) to his/her randomly matched Person A. After all Person B's have finished, the experimenter will collect the Emoticon Drawing Forms.
Stage 3: Person A receives Person B's drawing, Person B's are paid
Person A will be given the Emoticon Drawing Form from their randomly matched Person B. Person B's will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her earnings from the decision.
Stage 4: Person A's are paid
Appendix 3. Message Instructions Instructions
Roles and Pairing:
The Decision:
The decision Person A will be given a Decision Form; he/she will indicate the dividing option he/she wishes to choose by circling it on the decision form. After this choice is made the experimenter will collect all of the Decision Forms.
Stage 2: Person B receives Person A's decision
Person A's decision will be revealed to his/her randomly matched Person B, he/she will then have the opportunity to respond by writing and sending a message to his/her randomly matched Person A. After all Person B's have finished, the experimenter will collect the Message Forms.
Stage 3: Person A receives Person B's message, Person B's are paid
Person A will be given the Message Form from their randomly matched Person B. Person B's will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her earnings from the decision.
Stage 4: Person A's are paid
Once you have been paid you are free to leave, we ask that you do not wait around outside the lab. Thank you for participating. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to answer your question privately. 
